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How Does Democracy Influence Citizens¶ Perceptions of Government Corruption?  
A Cross-National Study 
Abstract 
We examine the effect of democracy as an institutional context on LQGLYLGXDOV¶ 
perceptions of government corruption. To do so, we compile an integrated dataset from 
the Asian, Afro, and Latino Barometer surveys and use a hierarchical linear regression 
model. Our primary finding is that the effect of democracy has different effects on 
RUGLQDU\ FLWL]HQV¶ SHUFHSWLRQV RI FRUUXSWLRQ in different contexts. In general, people in 
countries with higher levels of democracy tend to perceive their governments to be more 
corrupt. However, more importantly, conditional models show that in countries with 
more developed democratic institutions, individuals with stronger democratic values are 
less likely to perceive the government to be corrupt. Moreover, people in such countries 
are less likely to assess their government based on their perceptions of economic 
situation. 
Keywords: democracy, corruption, perceptions of government corruption, multilevel 
analysis 
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Introduction 
The existing literature on democracy and corruption focuses on whether and how 
democracy influences government corruption in reality.1 In this study, we turn our 
attention to a much-neglected area in this stream of literature: the impact of democracy 
RQ FLWL]HQV¶ SHUFHSWLRQs of corruption. We do so for two reasons: First, most extant 
studies of the effect of democracy on presumed actual corruption in fact use perceptions 
rather than corruption per se as the dependent variable (mainly using CPI2 and WGI3). 
Some scholars even contend that the real degree of corruption, which CPI and other 
measures intend to capture, cannot be measured directly due to the secretive nature of 
corruption and the complex criteria for corruption across countries/cultures.4 Scholars 
also are aware that perception-based indices for measuring corruption cannot clearly 
differentiate the reality of corruption from perceptions of corruption.5 As Treisman6 
VXJJHVWV WKDW ³µperceived corruption¶ PD\ UHIOHFW PDQ\ RWKHU WKLQJV EHVLGHV WKH
SKHQRPHQRQLWVHOI´.  
6HFRQG SHRSOH¶V SHUFHSWLRQV RI FRUUXSWLRQ DUH of critical importance  because of 
their erosive effect on political trust and political legitimacy. 7 They are important for 
both authoritative regimes and democracies. 8  As Warren 9  VWDWHV ³[corruption] 
undermines democratic capacities of association within civil society by generalizing 
suspicion and eroding trust and reciprocity.´ Based on empirical research of Latin 
America, scholars also have found that perceptions of corruption can create political 
skepticism, which, in turn, causes citizens to withdraw from public engagement. Further, 
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pHUFHSWLRQVRIFRUUXSWLRQZHDNHQFLYLO VRFLHWLHVE\³UHLQIRUFH>LQJ@ WKH WHFKQRFUDWLFDQG
delegative features of many democracies.´10  
Given WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI FLWL]HQV¶ SHUFHSWLRQV RI JRYHUQPHQW FRUUXSWLRQ DQG WKH
inadequate scholarly attention devoted to the effect of democracy on corruption 
perceptions, in this study, we examine how democracy as a macro-institutional context 
DIIHFWVLQGLYLGXDOV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIFRUUXSWLRQSpecifically, we argue that in addition to its 
direFWHIIHFWRQSHRSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQVRIFRUUXSWLRQGHPRFUDF\promotes more favorable 
views of government integrity by moderating the relationship between perceptions of 
corruption and their correlates at the individual level.  
The two correlates we concern in this study are democratic values and economic 
perceptions. On the one hand, through institutional supply, democracy satisfies the needs 
of democratically oriented citizens and thus mitigates the harmful effect of democratic 
values on perceptions of government. On the other hand, by blurring the boundaries of 
government institutions¶ responsibilities through a separation and balance of power, 
democracy also attenuates the negative effect RI HFRQRPLF GLVWUHVV RQ LQGLYLGXDOV¶
assessments of government integrity. In other words, people become less instrumental in 
a more democratic country. In short, democracy reduces the effect of the factors at the 
individual level that may cause people to view the government as corruptive. 
Our study makes three contributions to the literature on corruption. First, it extends 
the literature to the individual level. Aside from the necessity of such a measurement, as 
argued above, a measurement at the individual level helps to avoid the problems of 
aggregate measurements of actual government corruption.11 Second, our study identifies 
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some mechanisms through which democracy contributes to more positive perceptions of 
government among citizens. We argue that the effect of a greater supply of democratic 
institutions in generating positive perceptions of the government is not direct or 
unmediated. Instead, the effect manifests by reshaping the relationship between 
perceptions of corruption and their determinants, namely, democratic values and 
economic perceptions.  
Third, we test the contextual and moderating effect of democracy by using combined 
data from three Barometer Surveys, i.e., the Asia Barometer, the Afro Barometer (Africa), 
and the Latino Barometer (Latin America). This combined dataset covers the largest 
number of countries (50 countries) outside western democracies, with varying levels of 
democracy. Although the different Barometer Surveys have coordinated their efforts by 
including some common questions, little effort has been made to utilize these questions 
in an analysis of individual attitudes. 
 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
In recent years, studies of comparative politics have combined variances across macro 
institutions and social structures with those of micro individual behavior and opinions by 
using multilevel analyses.12 This research approach is based on WKHFRQFHSWRI³QHVWHG
FLWL]HQV´ ³3HRSOH DUH QHVWHG LQ LGHQWLILDEOH FRQWH[WV²that is, they form attitudes and 
make choices in variable macro-political (or other) environments (or contexts).´13 
)ROORZLQJ$QGHUVRQDQG6LQJHU¶Vargument, the effect of contextual factors (democracy 
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LQ WKLV VWXG\RQFLWL]HQV¶DWWLWXGHVDQGEHKDYLRUV (corruption perceptions in this study) 
can be parsed into direct and conditional (or contingent) effects.  
 
Democracy and perceptions of corruption: The direct effect 
Although extant discussions of the effect of democracy on corruption are often intended 
to link democracy to corruption in reality, we borrow the insights of them to build our 
expectation with regard to the effect of democracy on corruption in perceptions. 
Presumably, a more corruptive government in reality should correlate with a population 
of citizens with perceptions of a higher level of government corruption. Conventionally, 
democracy is believed to be able to UHGXFH SXEOLF RIILFLDOV¶ RSSRUWXQLWLHV WR PLVXVH
discretion by pluralizing political power, enhancing the transparency of policy decisions, 
DQG LQFUHDVLQJ RIILFLDOV¶ DFFRXQWDELOLW\ WR WKH HOHFWRUDWH Some empirical studies have 
confirmed such a corruption-reducing effect of democracy.14 However, such a finding 
faces two challenges. First, given the problem of measuring corruption, these studies 
actually use corruption perceptions, most often those of elites or experts, as the 
dependent variable to proxy for the reality of corruption, and such a practice has not been 
well justified. Given the importance of corruption perceptions themselves, we in this 
study directly explore how ordinary citizens living in democratic contexts perceive 
government differently from those living in non-democratic regimes through a 
cross-national study of individual attitudes. 
Second, in the literature of the relationship between democracy and corruption, 
many more scholars have pointed out how both corruption in reality and in perceptions 
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can actually increases in democracies.15 According to Rose-Akerman,16 for instance, 
three factors of a democratic polity are responsible IRU SROLWLFLDQV¶ LQYROYHPHQW LQ
political corruption: the existence of narrow benefits available for distribution by 
politicians, the ability of wealthy groups to obtain these benefits legally, and the 
existence of constraints on politicians generated by their desire for reelection. Further, 
Johnston pointed out that in four types of corruption, three can occur in democracies: 
LQIOXHQFH PDUNHW´ FRUUXSWLRQ ³HOLWH FDUWHOV´ FRUUXSWLRQ DQG ³ROLJDUFKV DQG FODQV´
corruption17  
When the scope expands to non-democracies, the ability of democracy to mitigate 
corruption becomes even more debatable. In large-N global comparative studies, the 
effect of democracy on corruption is mixed, with some research finding no significant 
relationship. For example, Fisman and Gatti18 and Ades and Di Tella19  found no 
significant effect of democracy on corruption in cross-national statistical models. Case 
studies have reported similar findings. Sun and Johnston20, for instance, compared India 
(a large, poor democracy) with China (a large, undemocratic state) and concluded that 
democratic India has no clear advantage over authoritarian China in controlling 
corruption. 
Moreover, according to Mohtadi and Roe, democracy, as compared to autocracies, 
engenders more rent seekers because of an increased information flow and easier access 
to government officials who control rents. Thus, less institutionalized democratization 
encourages corruption in a young democracy because constraints on rent seekers are 
insufficient.21 Empirical studies from Latin American democracies told a similar story. 
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As argued by Keefer, 22  the inability of politicians (especially emerging political 
competitors in younger democracies) to make credible promises to citizens drives 
politicians to build their own patron-client networks and thus to engage in rent-seeking 
activities.23  
In addition, democracy directly increases mass perceptions of corruption through its 
core institutional arrangement²election and political competition. Scholars of U.S. 
electoral campaigns have found that political contests can be incredibly dirty²the closer 
the race is, the meaner the campaign is.24 With such campaigns, exposure of corruption 
is often used as a tool to undermine and discredit political opponents. Weyland also 
found that, in Latin America, the rise in neopopulism drives political competitors to reach 
people by television and other mass media, which are very costly. ThHQ ³the new 
media-based politics [gave] ambitious politicians much higher incentives to resort to 
corruption.´25 Moreover, Sharafutdinova26 reports ³WKDWSXEOLFSHUFHSWLRQVRIFRUUXSWLRQ
are higher in more politically competitive regions.´Using Taiwan Integrity Survey (TIS) 
data, Yu, Chen, and Lin27 found that democratization increases Taiwanese perceptions of 
corruption owing to competitive political parties¶ PHGLD FDPSDLJQs via television 
networks. In contrast to democratic regimes, authoritarian regimes can reduce 
perceptions of corruption by censoring public media. For instance, Zhu, Lu, and Shi28 
show that control of mainstream mass media by the Chinese Central Government reduces 
SHRSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQVRIFRUUXSWLRQ 
In summary, democracy may increase indiYLGXDOV¶ SHUFHSWLRQs of corruption by 
enabling untamed corruption activities, on the one hand, and by framing public opinions 
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via media exposure in political campaigns, on the other. Therefore, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
H1: Democracy as an instiWXWLRQDO FRQWH[W LQFUHDVHV FLWL]HQV¶ SHUFHSWLRQV RI
government corruption. 
 
Democracy, economic well-being, and corruption perceptions 
IQGLYLGXDOV¶ DWWLWXGHV DQG EHKDYLRUV are believed to rest on primarily two perceptional 
bases: instrumental calculations and intrinsic values (Bratton, & Mattes, 2001; Citrin, 
1974; Easton, 1975; Finkel, Muller, & Seligson, 1989; Lipset, & Schneider, 1987; Miller, 
1974; Muller, & Jukam, 1977; Norris 1999; Rose, Mishler, & Munro, 2011).29 While 
instrumental calculations relatHWRRQH¶VMXGJPHQWDERXWPDWHULDOEHQHILWVGHOLYHUHGE\D
regime, intrinsic values concern the fundamental values and norms for which a regime 
stands.  
From an instrumental-UDWLRQDOSHUVSHFWLYHFLWL]HQV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIFRUUXSWLRQFDQEH
influenced by their self-evaluation of economic situation. People will likely to believe 
that their government is less corrupt when their economic situation is good. This 
rationale is often used to explain why voters tend to condone corrupt politicians.30 
Konstantinidis and Xezonakis 31  found that Greeks somewhat accept the exchange 
between a certain level of corruption and economic benefits. Further, Zechmeister and 
Zizumbo-Colunga 32  VKRZ WKDW ³LQGLYLGXDOV IDFLQJ EDG JRRG FROOHFWLYH HFRQRPLF
conditions apply a higher (lower) penalty to presidential approval for perceived 
corruption.´ 
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H2a: Perceptions of a better economic situation are associated with perceptions of a 
lower level of government corruption. 
We further argue that the impact of economic perceptions on perceived corruption is 
not uniform across national borders. Rather, the relative magnitude of this effect depends 
RQWKHUHJLPH¶VVXSSO\RIGHPRFUDF\6SHFLILFDOO\ZHDUJXHWKDWWKHUHJLPH¶VVXSSO\RI
democratic institutions significantly and positively moderates the negative impact of 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶ economic perceptions on perceived government corruption. That is, while a 
worse economic situation increases corruption perceptions, it does so more in autocracies 
than in democracies. This moderating effect occurs because the very design of 
democratic institutions renders economic success or failure attributable less to the regime 
itself and more to incumbent political leaders. Moreover, democratic regimes dampen 
SROLWLFDO DFWRUV¶ GLVVDWLVIDFWLRQ ZLWK WKH UHJLPH ³E\ LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]LQJ RSSRUWXQLWLHV IRU
leadership and policy change.´33 Therefore, in a functioning democracy, economic 
KDUGVKLSVDUHOHVVOLNHO\WREHFRQQHFWHGZLWKFLWL]HQV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIFRUUXSWLRQ  
In a sharp contrast to the situation in democratic countries, economic responsibility 
in authoritarian countries is more closely associated with the regime itself. A key 
characteristic of authoritarian regimes is the natural fusion of the ruling elites with the 
regime. In most non-democratic countries, governments monopolize economic sources 
and abuse political power to intervene in market transactions. Citizens and 
businesspersons have no viable channels by which to influence political decision making, 
and the economic elites have no choice but to buy policies by bribing public officials or 
building patron-client networks with politicians. Accordingly, when considering 
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economic performance, citizens in non-democracies are less able to distinguish between 
the incumbents and the regime; thus, they readily attribute their economic well-being to 
the malignancy or benignancy of the regime.  
Moreover, lacking institutional legitimacy, authoritarian regimes claim to rule 
³JHQHUDOO\EDVHGXSRQ  VRFLRHFRQRPLFSHUIRUPDQFHRUZKDWKDVEHHQFDOOHGµVRFLDl 
HXGDHPRQLF¶OHJLWLPDWLRQ.´This socioeconomic grounding is likely to be the single most 
important basis for political legitimacy.34 Empirical studies in countries such as China, 
Singapore, and Vietnam have confirmed the centrality of economic circumstances in 
boosting an authoritarian UHJLPH¶V legitimacy, particularly after the collapse of the 
Communist ideology.35 Thus, although authoritarian regimes may enjoy all the benefits 
accompanied by economic growth, they also are likely to take full responsibility for any 
economic downturns. 
In summary, when evaluating a regime, people living in authoritarian regimes are 
more likely to connect economic perceptions with corruption perceptions than people 
living in democracies. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H2b: The negative effect of economic perceptions on corruption perceptions is 
smaller in magnitude in democracies as compared to autocracies. 
 
Democracy, democratic values, and corruption perceptions 
Theoretically, we then SURSRVH D SRVLWLYH FRUUHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ LQGLYLGXDOV¶ GHPRFUDWLF
values and their perceptions of corruption²that is, a more democratically minded person 
is more likely to perceive government corruption. Democracy, as institutionally and 
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procedurally defined, is a series of arrangements to prevent the abuse of political power 
via monopolization by political leaders. Thus, people with high democratic values 
(democratic-minded citizens) tend to demand checks and balances on public power. 
CRUUXSWLRQ FDQ EH GHILQHG DV WKH ³PLVXVH RI SXEOLF SRZHU IRU SULYDWH JDLQ.´36 Hence, 
people with high democratic values, who expect political (public) power be strictly 
limited, are more likely to critically assess whether the regime setting sufficiently limits 
opportunities for corruption.37  
H3a: A higher level of democratic values is associated with a higher level of 
perceived government corruption. 
Moreover, we expect the impact of democratic aspirations to vary depending on the 
regime setting. Specifically, we argue that the positive impact of democratic aspirations 
on corruption perceptions is significantly and negatively moderated by a UHJLPH¶VVXSSO\
of democratic institutions. That is, a democratically oriented person is less likely to view 
the government more corruptive in democracies than in autocracies. This is so because 
citizens in undemocratic countries often have every reason to attribute government 
corruption WRWKHUHJLPH¶VXQGHPRFUDWLFRSHUDWLRQ as a whole. For instance, in Indonesia, 
WKHURWWHQQHVVRIWKH6XKDUWRUHJLPHZDVDVFULEHGWRLWVDXWKRULWDULDQQDWXUH³,QGRQHVLD¶V
SROLWLFDOV\VWHP«in practice is a democratic facade fronting highly personalized rule.´38 
Another case is Daniel arap Moi,39 the second President of Kenya from 1978 to 2002. 
0RL¶V UHJLPH ZDV PDUUHG E\ FRUUXSWLRQ ZKLFK was believed to arise from Kenyan 
pseudo democratic institutions.40  
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Another key aspect of the impact of individuals¶ democratic values concerns the 
quality of democratic institutions, in which integrity is a salient dimension.41 In regimes 
with basic democratic institutions, democracy can be strengthened by building 
democratic institutions. Individuals with strong democratic values will hence be more 
satisfied in more mature democracies than in low-quality democracies with flawed 
democratic institutions. Therefore, the erosive effect of democratic values on government 
legitimacy would be much weaker in a mature democracy than in a low-quality 
democracy. That is, the magnitude of the positive impact of democratic values on 
perceptions of corruption would be decreased by democratic institutions that serve as the 
regime context. Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H3b: The positive association between democratic values and corruption 
perceptions is weaker in democracies compared to autocracies. 
 
Data and Variables 
Data  
7R H[DPLQH WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ GHPRFUDF\ DQG LQGLYLGXDOV¶ SHUFHSWLRQV RI
government corruption, we compile a dataset on developing countries from three 
cross-national surveys: the Asian Barometer Survey (the second wave) (ABS hereafter),42 
the Afro Barometer Survey (the fourth round) (FBS hereafter), 43  and the Latino 
Barometer Survey (2008) (LBS hereafter).44 Combining these three surveys allows us to 
FRYHUWKUHHPDMRUGHYHORSLQJUHJLRQVDQGWRWHVWRXUK\SRWKHVHVRQDODUJHVFDOH&LWL]HQV¶
QRW HOLWHV¶ perceptions of government corruption have never been studied to such an 
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extensive degree. We are able to combine these three datasets because there are identical 
or similar variables in each dataset, including self-economic evaluations, political trust, 
media use, political engagement, democratic values, and perceptions of government 
corruption.  
We select the recent datasets that were compiled in the same year or in adjacent years: 
the second wave of the ABS (2006±2008), the fourth round of the FBS (2008), and the 
LBS of 2008. Further, we select the survey questions of interest that have identical or 
highly similar wording and response scales. We then recode all the variables to ensure 
that their coding and directions are the same. The combined dataset includes 53,065 
individuals and 50 countries, including 12 East Asian countries, 20 African countries, and 
18 Latin American countries.  
 
Perceptions of government corruption 
Our dependent variable is perceptions of government corruption. This variable is 
measured with different instruments in three Barometer Surveys. Specifically, in the ABS, 
two questions measure UHVSRQGHQWV¶ SHUFHSWLRQV RI JRYHUQPHQW FRUUXSWLRQ ³+RZ
widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in your local/municipal 
gRYHUQPHQW"´ DQG ³+RZ ZLGHVSUHDG GR \RX WKLQN FRUUXSWLRQ DQG EULEH-taking are in 
\RXUQDWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQW"´Answers to the question are coded on a 4-point scale from 1 
to 4, with 1 being ³hardly anyone is involved´ and 4 being ³almost everyone is corrupt´ 
In the )%6UHVSRQGHQWV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIFRUUXSWLRQDUHtapped in an eight-item question: 
³+RZPDQ\RIWKHIROORZLQJSHRSOHGR\RXWKLQNDUHLQYROYHGLQFRUUXSWLRQRUKDYHQ¶W
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\RXKHDUGHQRXJKDERXWWKHPWRVD\"´7KHDQVZHUV are coded on a 4-point Likert scale 
(0-3), where 0 indicates ³none´ and 3 indicates ³all of them.´ From the eight institutions 
assessed by this questionZHFKRVH ³WKH3UHVLGHQW DQG2IILFLDOV LQKLVKHU2IILFH´ DQG
³MHPEHUV RI 3DUOLDPHQW´ WR PHDVXUH SHUFHSWLRQV RI FRUUXSWLRQ LQ QDWLRQDO institutions 
DQGFKRVH³Local Government CRXQFLORUV´WRPHDVXUHSHUFHSWLRQVRIORFDOJRYHUQPHQW
corruption. Perceptions of government corruption are measured with one general 
question in the /%6³,PDJLQHthat the total number of public employees is 100 and that 
you would have to say how many of those you think are corrupt. How many would you 
VD\"´7KHDQVZHUis a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 100.  
To generate a comparable variable of perceptions of corruption, for the respondents 
in all three samples, we recode the variables and create an index of government 
corruption. This index ranges from 0 for lowest corruption perceptions to 1 for highest 
corruption perceptions. More details regarding the wording and coding rules are 
presented in the Appendix. 
Political democracy 
To ensure that our analytical results are not driven by the choice of a particular 
measurement of democracy, we use two widely used datasets on democracy: 
³'HPRFUDF\DQG'LFWDWRUV´ ''DQG3ROLW\ ,9'' LVDGLFKRWRPRXVPHDVXUHPHQW of 
GHPRFUDF\ XSGDWHG IURP WKH ³3ROLWLFDO DQG (FRQRPLF 'DWDEDVH.´45 DD categorizes a 
polity as a democracy if the executive is elected via the legislature or if the legislature is 
directly elected, there is more than one party, and the executive power alternates. Polity 
IV is a continuous measurement of democracy with a 21-point (from -10 to 10) scale. It 
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quantifies five institutional aspects of democracy: competitiveness of participation, 
regulation of participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of 
executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive.46  
 
Democratic values and self-economic evaluations 
Our key independent variables at the individual level are democratic values and 
self-economic evaluations, ZKLFK UHIOHFW LQGLYLGXDOV¶ SHUFHSWLRQDO EDVHV RI intrinsic 
values and instrumental calculations, respectively. With regard to democratic values, all 
three surveys assess the extent to which respondents agree with a set of statements that 
reflect their democratic orientation.. Specifically, in the ABS and the FBS, respondents 
are asked whether they reject one-man rule, one-party rule, or military rule.47 In the LBS, 
two questions capture whether respondents reject one-man rule or one-party rule.48 We 
average the responses to these questions and generate a composite index of democratic 
values ranging from 0 for lowest democratic orientation to 1 for highest democratic 
orientation. We fully acknowledge that this index does not comprehensively capture ones¶ 
democratic orientations. We are not able to obtain a more comprehensive measurement 
due to the lack of coherent questions asked in three Barometer surveys. But at the same 
time, we believe that our measurement suffices to gauge democratic values. In particular, 
the three questions asked in this index concern the procedural and institutional aspects of 
a political system. Such an index avoids the problem that directly questions about the 
norms of democracy might induce socially desired answers. Moreover, the measurements 
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of democracy (namely, DD and Polity IV) we use in this study mainly focuses on 
democratic institutions and procedures.  
Self-economic evaluations are directly measured by responses to questions in all 
three surveys. Respondents are asked to describe their present economic situations. 
Responses are given on a 5-point scale and are recoded such that higher scores indicate 
better economic situations. 
 
Control variables 
At the individual level, we include necessary socio-demographic factors that are recorded 
in all three surveys: gender, age, and education level. We also include the frequency of 
Internet use49 to control for LWVHIIHFWVRQFLWL]HQV¶FRUUXSWLRQSHUFHSWLRQVIn recent years, 
the Internet has come to play a pivotal role in political communication. From the Internet, 
people can acquire various types of negative news about the government, including 
scandals of political corruption. We also control for interpersonal trust.50 Individuals 
who tend to trust others are more likely to trust public officials.51 Therefore, we expect 
interpersonal trust to decrease FLWL]HQV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIJRYHUQPHQWFRUUXSWLRQ 
At an aggregate level, we add three other control variables: GDP per capita (logged) 
from the World Bank DataBank,52 control of corruption from the WGI,53 and economic 
retreat. According to Kurtz and Schrank,54 perceptions of the public institutions are 
substantially influenced by recent economic performance. Specifically, in 2007 and 2008, 
the world economy encountered the worst financial crises triggered by the United States 
housing bubble. In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, a number of countries have 
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experienced major economic depressions. To control for the potential influence of 
economic retreat on mass perceptions of corruption, we generate a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 for years with a reduction in economic growth of 3% or more relative 
to the previous year and 0 otherwise. For the sake of brevity, a full discussion of our 
expectations regarding the effects of these variables is omitted. We take the values of all 
the aggregate-level variables in the same survey year of the three Barometer Surveys. 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for all the relevant variables. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Relevant Variables (N=53065) 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Individual level     
Corruption perceptionsa 0.50 0.29 0 1 
Democratic valuesa 0.71 0.30 0 1 
Economic evaluation 2.86 1.00 1 5 
Genderb 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Age 40.01 16.01 16 110 
Educational level 1.49 0.79 0 3 
Internet use b 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Inter-personal trust b 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Country level     
Democracy (Polity IV) 4.88 5.29 -7 10 
Democracy (DD) b 0.62 0.48 0 1 
GDP per capita (log) 7.39 1.38 5.11 10.62 
Corruption control -0.22 0.71 -1.36 2.22 
Economic retreat b 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Note: a. continuous variables; b. dichotomous variables. 
 
Statistical Models and Findings 
To test our hypotheses, we use a HLM. One of the key advantages of a multilevel model 
is that it enables not only a more accurate estimation of the additive effects of both the 
individual and contextual correlates but also the estimation of cross-level interactions 
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between contextual factors and individual factors. Table 2 presents the results of the 
regression using this method. 
Table 2. Hierarchical Linear Models of Corruption Perceptions (with Polity IV) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Fixed effects 
Individual level 
      
Gender  -0.0041* -0.0046** -0.0044** -0.0044** -0.0038* 
(male=1)  (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) 
Age  -0.00030*** -0.00035*** -0.00031*** -0.00031*** -0.00026*** 
  (0.000078) (0.000076) (0.000078) (0.000078) (0.000079) 
Education  0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
  (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Internet use  0.022*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 
  (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) 
Inter-personal  -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.035*** 
Trust  (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0025) 
Democratic  0.036***  0.035*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
Values  (0.0072)  (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0072) 
Economic   -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
evaluation   (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Aggregate level       
Polity IV  0.011*** -0.00090 0.0055 0.010*** 0.010*** 
  (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0022) (0.0024) 
Corruption     -0.15*** -0.11*** 
Control     (0.017) (0.012) 
GDP per capita     0.042***  
(log)     (0.011)  
Economic retreat      0.026 
      (0.019) 
Cross-level 
interaction 
      
Polity*democratic  -0.0094***  -0.0094*** -0.0094*** -0.0095*** 
Values  (0.00095)  (0.00095) (0.00095) (0.00096) 
Polity*Economic   0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0017*** 
evaluation   (0.00023) (0.00024) (0.00024) (0.00024) 
Continent dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
constant 0.51*** 0.61*** 0.70*** 0.67*** 0.25*** 0.58*** 
 (.022) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.094) (0.026) 
Random effects       
constant 026*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. N of countries = 49. N of individuals = 52408. 
Significance: *.1; **.05; ***.01.  
 
We first gauge the intra-class correlation (ICC) of perceptions of corruption in a null 
model (Model 1). The equation is:   ൌ ɒ଴଴ɒ଴଴ ൅ ɐଶ ൌ ͲǤͲʹ͸ͲǤͲʹ͸ ൅ ͲǤͲ͸ͳ ൎ ͲǤ͵ͲͲ 
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where Wis the country-level variance, and Vis the residual. The ICC score shows that 
30% of the variation in perceptions of corruption resides between countries. This result 
indicates that we must consider country-level determinants when estimating individual 
corruption perceptions. 
In the other five models of Table 2 (Models 2±6), we use Polity IV as the 
measurement of democracy and examine its relationship with perceptions of corruption. 
In Model 2, we include all variables at the individual level, including democratic values 
and economic perceptions, but we only include democracy at the aggregate level because 
of the limited number of units at the country level. In addition, to estimate the conditional 
effect of democracy, we first include an interaction term between democracy and 
democratic values in this model. The results of the HLM regression show that when we 
control for demographic variables (gender, age, and education level), Internet use, and 
inter-personal trust, democratic values has a significantly positive effect on individual 
corruption perceptions. Further, the coefficient of the cross-level interaction of Polity IV 
and democratic values is negative and significant. This result indicates that democracy 
decreases the positive effect of democratic values on perceived government corruption. 
Substantively, this result suggests that an individual with a certain level of democratic 
orientation is less likely to perceive a government to be corrupt in a country with a higher 
level of democracy than in other countries.  
In Model 3, we use the same strategy to include the interaction between individual 
self-economic evaluations and democracy. The results also confirm our expectations. 
Economic evaluations have a significant negative effect on individual corruption 
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perceptions. The coefficient of the cross-level interaction of Polity IV and economic 
evaluations is positive and statistically significant. This result indicates that democracy 
mitigates the negative effect of economic evaluations on perceived corruption. 
Substantively, this result suggests that a higher level of democracy in a country renders 
its citizens less likely to judge the government based on their own economic situation. 
We include both interaction terms simultaneously in Model 4 and further include a 
full set of aggregate variables in Model 5 and Model 6. Being aware of the high 
correlation between GDP per capita and economic retreat, we control for these two 
variables separately to avoid a multicollinearity problem. As expected, the direction and 
significance of the effects of key individual variables and the cross-level interactions are 
consistent with the results of the previous models. Even when we control for the effect of 
GDP per capita (logged), corruption control, and economic retreat at the country level, 
we still find that democracy is positively associated with corruption perceptions.  
To provide a more graphic interpretation, we plot the marginal effect of democratic 
values (Figure 1) and the effect of self-economic evaluations (Figure 2), based on Model 
4. Regarding democratic values, we first find that its effect on corruption perceptions is 
statistically significant and positive at lower levels of democracy. This result indicates 
that people with higher democratic values are more critical of the ruling regime when the 
regime lacks a supply of democratic institutions. Moreover, as the levels of democracy 
increase, the critical effect of democratic values decreases. In particular, when the level 
of democracy reaches a very high level, people with higher democratic values have more 
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faith in the integrity of the government and its officials. That is, in a full democracy, a 
democratically oriented citizen places considerable trust in the government. 
  
Figure 1. Effect of democratic values on perceptions of corruption as moderated by democracy. 
 
 
Figure 2. Effect of self-economic evaluations on perceptions of corruption as moderated by 
democracy. 
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Self-economic evaluations have a statistically significant and negative effect on 
perceived government corruption in less democratic countries (Figure 2). This result 
indicates that individuals who had been economically advantaged under an authoritarian 
regime are less likely to perceive the government to be corrupt and are more likely to 
hold favorable attitudes toward the regime. This result demonstrates the strong 
instrumental logic of political support in countries that lack an institutional supply of 
democracy. The effect of economic evaluations decreases in magnitude, however, with a 
higher level of democracy and becomes statistically insignificant in countries with the 
highest level of democracy. That is, people in democratic countries are less likely to 
judge a regime based on their instrumental rationality.  
To further show the robustness of our findings from the models presented in Table 2, 
we use DD as an alternative measurement of democracy and conduct the same set of 
hierarchical linear regressions. The results presented in Table 3 (Models 7±11) are fully 
consistent with those from the models presented in Table 2. Hence, all of our hypotheses 
are confirmed by the second set of regression models.  
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Table 3. Hierarchical Linear Models of Corruption Perceptions (with DD) 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Mode 10 Mode 11 
Fixed effects      
Individual level      
Gender -0.0041* -0.0047** -0.0044** -0.0044** -0.0038* 
(male=1) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) 
Age -0.00031*** -0.00035*** -0.00032*** -0.00033*** -0.00028*** 
 (0.000077) (0.000076) (0.000077) (0.000077) (0.000078) 
Education 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Internet use 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) 
Inter-personal -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.035*** 
trust (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Economic  -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
evaluation  (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Democratic 0.028***  0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 
values (0.0078)  (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0079) 
Aggregate level      
DD 0.24*** 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.19*** 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.026) (0.035) 
GDP per capita    0.076***  
(log)    (0.011)  
Corruption    -0.19*** -0.089*** 
control    (0.020) (0.021) 
Economic retreat     0.050 
     (0.036) 
Cross-level 
interaction 
     
DD*democratic -0.069***  -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.067*** 
values (0.0088)  (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0089) 
DD*economic  0.012*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 
evaluation  (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0023) 
Continent 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
constant 0.35*** 0.42*** 0.39*** -0.16** 0.37*** 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.079) (0.030) 
Random Effects      
constant 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.006*** 0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. N of countries = 50; N of individuals = 53065. 
Significance: *.1; **.05; ***.01.  
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Finally, considering the distinction between ordinary citizen¶s perceptions of 
corruption and the corruption per se, we run additional regressions to gauge the 
democracy¶s effect on real corruption level and corruption perceptions. We use CPI to 
measure the corruption reality (as perceived by experts) and the country-mean of 
perceptions of government corruption for aggregate-level corruption perceptions (of 
ordinary citizens). Table 4 presents the results. It shows that democracy has no direct 
effect on actual level of corruption since neither Polity IV nor DD is significantly 
associated with CPI at p = 0.05. When measured as DD, democracy increases real 
corruption level at p = 0.10. Democracy, however, as also indicated in analysis of Table 2 
and Table 3, is positively associated with corruption perceptions. That is, with a higher 
level of democracy, citizens on average perceive the government to be more corruptive. 
In short, both sets of analyses indicate the harmful effect of democracy on corruption in 
both reality and perceptions.  
Table 4. The Effect of Democracy on CPI, and country-averaged corruption perceptions 
 Corruption reality Corruption perceptions 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
Polity IV -0.010  0.015***  
 (0.042)  (0.0020)  
DD  -0.56*  0.13*** 
  (0.33)  (0.024) 
GDP per capita 0.82*** 0.90*** 0.095*** 0.087*** 
(log) (0.17) (0.14) (0.011) (0.012) 
Economic retreat -0.76* -0.81** 0.0026 0.0040 
 (0.39) (0.37) (0.028) (0.027) 
Corruption    -0.23*** -0.20*** 
Control   (0.022) (0.022) 
constant -2.10** -2.36** -0.32*** -0.26*** 
 (1.03) (0.92) (0.080) (0.083) 
R2 0.51 0.58 0.78 0.77 
N 49 50 49 50 
Note: Dependent variable in Model1 and Model2 is the Corruption Perception Index from Transparent 
International. Dependent variable in Model3 and Model4 is the country means of citizens¶ perceptions of 
government corruption from our dataset. All are OLS models with robust standard errors in parentheses; 
Significance:* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
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Conclusions and Implications 
Although existing studies suggest that democracy drives trust in government, this article 
depicts dual effects of democracy on perceptions of government corruption. Treating the 
institutional supply of democracy both as a direct determinant and as the contextual 
FRQGLWLRQ RI FLWL]HQV¶ SHUFHSWLRQV RI JRYHUQPHQW FRUUXSWLRQ ZH ILQG WKDW democracy 
plays a dual role in affecting RUGLQDU\FLWL]HQV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIFRUUXSWLRQDVLQGLFDWHGLQ
our analysis of cross-national surveys from East Asia, Africa, and Latin America. First, 
our study identifies a significant relationship between macro institutional democracy and 
micro individual perceptions of government corruption. In Asia (mainly Eastern and 
Southeastern Asia), Africa, and Latin America, democracy itself is associated with higher 
levels of perceptions of government corruption. Second, when we turn to our primary 
interest in the conditional effects of rationality, including both instrumental calculations 
and intrinsic values, on corruption perceptions, we find the opposite effect. The effect of 
democracy, as institutionally defined, is found to be generally benevolent. With an 
increasing supply of democratic institutions, the relationship between democratic values 
and perceptions of government corruption is weakened among ordinary citizens. 
Moreover, the magnitude of the negative impact of LQGLYLGXDOV¶ economic distress on 
perceptions of government integrity corruption decreases. This result indicates that 
compared with citizens in authoritarian regimes, citizens in democratic systems are less 
likely to attribute the improvement of their personal economic situations to government 
performance. 
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Today, in Asia, Africa, and Latin American, most recently democratized democracies 
have experienced extraordinary trials. With scholarly support for the strong resilience of 
³XVHU-IULHQGO\´DXWKRULWDULDQVWKHUDFHEHWZHHQGHPRFUDFLHVDQGDXWKRULWDULDQUHJLPHVis 
intensifying. Further, the advantage of democracy in maintaining public support is being 
questioned. However, our study indicates that democracy still has the advantage of 
PLWLJDWLQJ FLWL]HQV¶ grievances about government stemming from both instrumental 
calculations and intrinsic values. The dual nature of democracy in terms of influencing 
LQGLYLGXDOV¶perceptions of corruption implies that we should use caution when drawing 
conclusions about the institutional outcomes of democracy. 
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